Constitutional Remedies and Public Interest Balancing by Greabe, John M.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 3 Article 5
Constitutional Remedies and Public Interest
Balancing
John M. Greabe
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
John M. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 857
(2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol21/iss3/5
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AND
PUBLIC INTEREST BALANCING
John M. Greabe*
ABSTRACT
The conventional account of our remedial tradition recognizes that courts may
engage in discretionary public interest balancing to withhold the specific remedies
typically administered in equity. But it generally does not acknowledge that courts
possess the same power with respect to the substitutionary remedies usually provided
at law. The conventional account has things backwards when it comes to constitutional
remedies. The modern Supreme Court frequently requires the withholding of substi-
tutionary constitutional relief under doctrines developed to protect the perceived public
interest. Yet it has treated specific relief to remedy ongoing or imminent invasions of
rights as routine, at least when the underlying claim is justiciable and subject to neither
a judicial federalism doctrine nor statutory preclusion.
This paper details the reversal of the conventional account of remedial power and
advances a two-part hypothesis that the Court’s behavior traces an appropriate con-
stitutional boundary. The hypothesis is as follows. First, substitutionary constitutional
remedies, while integral to the proper functioning of our constitutional order, are indi-
vidually contingent and susceptible of legislative or judicial expansion, contraction,
or replacement as the perceived public interest dictates. But second, specific relief
must be available for justiciable and meritorious claims of constitutional right to which
neither a judicial federalism nor a statutory diversion doctrine applies, and an effective
constitutional remedy ultimately must be available even in these exceptional cases.
INTRODUCTION
The conventional account of our remedial tradition recognizes that courts may
engage in discretionary public interest balancing to withhold the specific remedies
typically administered in equity.1 But it generally does not acknowledge that courts
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suggestions on earlier versions of this Article, I would like to thank Susan Bandes, Calvin
Massey, Margaret Sova McCabe, Jack Preis, Mitch Simon, Howard Wasserman, and partici-
pants in the 2012 Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop held at Florida International Law
School. I also thank the editors and staff of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for
their excellent work in improving this paper.
1 I use the term “public interest balancing” to describe the practice of withholding relief,
even in the face of an invasion of rights, on the ground that the remedy sought would
adversely affect the public interest. Public interest balancing is an explicit part of the calculus
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possess the same power with respect to the substitutionary remedies2 usually available
at law.3 The conventional account has things backwards when it comes to constitutional
remedies.4 The modern Supreme Court frequently requires the withholding of substi-
tutionary constitutional relief under doctrines—qualified immunity,5 exceptions to the
exclusionary rule,6 harmless error rules,7 the unavailability of most “new law” on col-
lateral review8—developed to protect the perceived public interest.9 Yet it has treated
specific relief to remedy ongoing or imminent invasions of rights as routine,10 at least
courts apply in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). But it also is an acknowledged component
of a court’s equitable discretion at the final judgment stage. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.
Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982); Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 327–30 (1944); United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289
U.S. 352, 360–61 (1933); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 160–61 (1991); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2942 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2012).
2 For reasons explained in Part II, I use the functional terms “specific” and “substi-
tutionary” rather than the historical terms “equitable” and “legal” to classify constitutional
remedies. Although “most equitable remedies are specific” and “most legal remedies are
substitutionary . . . there are . . . exceptions in both directions” that make the equity/law
distinction an unfit proxy for the specific/substitutionary distinction. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 6 (4th ed. 2010).
3 An exception applies with respect to those legal remedies, such as mandamus, that are
by their nature more like the specific remedies historically available from equity courts. See
Dern, 289 U.S. at 359 (“Although the remedy by mandamus is at law, its allowance is con-
trolled by equitable principles, and it may be refused for reasons comparable to those which
would lead a court of equity, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to withhold its protection
of an undoubted legal right.” (citations omitted)).
4 The conventional account of our remedial tradition has been persuasively criticized on
other grounds as well. See LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 3–7 (summarizing his book’s argument
that, despite traditional understandings, the American legal system does not and has not given
primacy to substitutionary remedies over specific remedies).
5 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
7 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
8 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
9 In developing doctrines that require lower courts to withhold constitutional remedies,
the Supreme Court has exercised both a normative discretion to withhold remedies and an
allocative discretion to cabin lower court discretion. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–47 (1985) (explaining the range of existing judicial
discretion). But a lower court’s decision to withhold a remedy because of public interest bal-
ancing is a decision to withhold a remedy because of public interest balancing, regardless of
whether it derives from an exercise of unconstrained equitable discretion or pursuant to a prece-
dential dictate from a higher court. Cf. supra note 1 (describing public interest balancing as a
component of a court’s equitable discretion).
10 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 724–25 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter FALLON ET AL., HART AND
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when the underlying claim is justiciable and subject to neither a judicial federalism
doctrine11 nor statutory preclusion.12
This paper details the reversal of the conventional account of remedial power and
suggests that its formal recognition could help to advance the debate over constitu-
tionally necessary remedies. This debate ranges between those who, on one end of the
spectrum, understand the maxim “where there is a right, there is a remedy”13 to be
a binding norm,14 and those who, on the other, conclude from their examination of
history that the only mandatory remedy for a constitutional violation is nullification
of a void enactment.15 Between these positions lies the influential view ventured by
Professors Richard Fallon, Jr., and Daniel Meltzer.16 Fallon and Meltzer’s argument,
while normative in its aspirations, is largely descriptive; it seeks to rationalize “the
doctrines and practices that have traditionally comprised the law of constitutional
remedies.”17 So what do these doctrines and practices tell us, according to Fallon and
Meltzer? First, there should be a strong but not always unyielding presumption in
WECHSLER] (citing Laycock, supra note 1, at 3–7, 41–42, 196, 223); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1112–13 (2010) [hereinafter
Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping]; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1395 (2007); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292 (1976) (“It is perhaps too
soon to reverse the traditional maxim to read that money damages will be awarded only when
no suitable form of specific relief can be devised. But surely, the old sense of equitable
remedies as ‘extraordinary’ has faded.”); infra Part III.B.
11 See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1013–1152, 1311–54
(analyzing statutory and judicially developed limitations on district court jurisdiction or its
exercise, such as exhaustion doctrines, abstention doctrines, and other doctrines of equity,
comity, and federalism); see also infra Part III.B.1.
12 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 320 (discussing
congressional apportionment of jurisdiction among federal courts); id. at 970–72 (discussing
statutory preclusion and diversion of civil rights claims); see also infra Part III.B.2.
13 The original Latin phrase is “Ubi jus, ibi remedium.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520
(6th ed. 1990); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled
and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury
its proper redress.”).
14 Among those who have so argued are Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach
to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987).
15 See John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies,
86 GEO. L.J. 2513 (1998).
16 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
17 Id. at 1737 (“Our aim in adopting this approach, rather than developing a more purely
normative theory, is partly to achieve enhanced clarity of doctrinal understanding; we hope to
further comprehension of what courts have done and continue to do, and of the presuppositions
that undergird their pattern of decisions.”).
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favor of individually effective relief for every constitutional violation.18 Second, there
must exist a sufficient scheme of available remedies to ensure that constitutional rights
do not become nullities, and that government officials remain answerable as a systemic
matter to the demands of law.19
I adopt Fallon and Meltzer’s methodology and, looking to the doctrines and prac-
tices that comprise the modern law of constitutional remedies, seek to draw lessons
from the distinct ways in which the modern Supreme Court has treated substitutionary
and specific constitutional remedies with respect to public interest balancing. Building
from a functional account of the law of constitutional remedies, I advance a two-part
hypothesis that the Court’s behavior traces an appropriate constitutional boundary.
The hypothesis is as follows. First, substitutionary constitutional remedies, while in-
tegral to the proper functioning of our constitutional order, are individually contingent
and susceptible of legislative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as the
perceived public interest dictates. But second, specific relief must be available for jus-
ticiable and meritorious claims of constitutional right to which neither a judicial feder-
alism nor a statutory diversion doctrine applies, and an effective constitutional remedy
ultimately must be available even in these exceptional cases.
I have organized the paper in the following way. Part I covers some preliminary
points about the premises and scope of my argument, and the method I employ to
classify constitutional remedies. Part II provides an account of the range of recog-
nized constitutional remedies that classifies in terms that are functional (specific or
substitutionary) rather than historical (equitable or legal). Classifying constitutional
remedies in functional rather than historical terms is conducive to both a defense and
an understanding of the paper’s foundational descriptive claim. Part III employs this
classification to demonstrate that modern courts frequently apply doctrines grounded
in public interest balancing to withhold substitutionary relief for wholly realized consti-
tutional violations despite the fact that doing so leaves such violations entirely without
a remedy. In contrast, when faced with claims for specific relief, courts do not invoke
the public interest to withhold relief altogether. Part IV connects the described reality
to the debate over constitutionally necessary remedies and hypothesizes that the differ-
ent ways in which the modern Supreme Court has treated substitutionary and specific
constitutional remedies with respect to public interest balancing reflects an appropriate
sense of the constitutional necessity of each.
I. PRELIMINARIES
The topic of constitutional remedies is extraordinarily rich. It is the subject of an
enormous and fascinating academic literature that exposes fault lines that run beneath,
and sometimes jolt, our constitutional order. It will therefore come as no surprise that
18 See id. at 1787–91.
19 See id.
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the pedigree and legitimacy of many of the substitutionary and specific constitutional
remedies described in Part II, and many of the remedy-limiting doctrines discussed in
Part III, are subjects of profound and basic disagreements. These disagreements reflect
fundamentally different ideas about the nature and scope of the “judicial Power” that
Article III of the Constitution confers on the federal courts, and about how the federal
courts ought to exercise that power.20
To illustrate, commentators have disagreed over whether the harmless error rule
adopted in Chapman v. California21 is better conceptualized as being rooted in the
Constitution itself22 or as constituting an example of the constitutional “common
law” whose existence and legitimacy Professor Henry Monaghan has famously iden-
tified and defended.23 Monaghan himself described the Chapman rule as an example
of constitutional common law24—a body of sub-constitutional, judge-made doctrine
that is “subject to [congressional] amendment, modification, or . . . reversal”25—and
other commentators have agreed.26 But even if a consensus were to emerge that the
Chapman rule is indeed an example of constitutional common law, the debate would
merely proceed to an even more fundamental disagreement over the rule’s legitimacy.
For there are those who strongly believe that judges lack the authority to make con-
stitutional common law and must confine themselves to elaborating “true” constitu-
tional meaning.27 And it is difficult to defend Chapman as being a constitutionally
compelled rule.28
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman requires appellate courts to find that a constitutional trial
error was harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to disregard the error. See id. at 24;
see also infra Part III.A.3.
22 See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 421, 424 n.31 (1980) (referring to the Chapman rule as a “constitutional
judgment”).
23 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (describing constitutional common law as
a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions”).
24 See Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP.
CT. REV. 195, 200 n.30 (citing Monaghan, supra note 23, at 21).
25 See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 3.
26 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1994); Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Harmless Error as Constitutional
Common Law: Congress’s Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 985,
1005–12 (1993).
27 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1985) (calling Monaghan’s theory “constitutionally unprincipled”); Thomas
S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1117 (1978). For a summary of the argument that remedies must issue from legislatures,
see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.2, at 610–11 (6th ed. 2007).
28 See Meltzer, supra note 26, at 5–18 (explaining the difficulties with viewing Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), as constitutionally rooted in view of other established rules
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I acknowledge disagreements such as these. But I cannot express opinions on
them, and defend those opinions, without turning this paper into a book. Therefore, I
shall simply clarify at the outset three related points about my working premises and
the paper’s scope. First, I approach the problems addressed through the general law
of remedies, which contains valuable lessons for the study of the more specific field
of constitutional remedies.29 Second, I take as a given the legitimacy of broad judi-
cial discretion in fashioning constitutional remedies, for reasons amply and ably elab-
orated by others.30 I shall not repeat their arguments here except as is necessary to
contextualize my own. Third, for reasons I shall explain in Part IV, I see the law of
substitutionary constitutional remedies as being most helpfully conceived as a body
of sub-constitutional common law subject to legislative and judicial alteration; by con-
trast, I see the law of specific constitutional remedies as being more firmly rooted in
the Constitution itself.31
One additional point of initial clarification is also in order. In keeping with the
paper’s theme of function over form, I describe constitutional remedies in terms that
emphasize the type of relief (functionally speaking) that they afford, and not in terms
that focus attention on the particularized legal and equitable vehicles through which
constitutional remedies historically have been provided.32 Thus, I do not afford separate
and doctrines); Goldblatt, supra note 26, at 1010–12 (explaining how the Court’s reasoning
in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), negates the possibility of viewing Chapman
as a constitutional rule).
29 Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1764–67 (explaining the value of examining the
topics of legal novelty and retroactivity within the framework of the law of remedies).
30 See, e.g., Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1134–35; Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 16, at 1779–91 (discussing the importance of the availability of constitutional
remedies); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 1389–408 (discussing the development of
constitutional remedies); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies,
86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2549–65 (1998); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional
Damage Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1129–42 (1989) (explaining that fashioning constitu-
tional remedies is a legitimate use of judicial power); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law,
Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW.
U. L. REV. 761, 796–97 (1989) (recognizing judicial authority to protect basic constitutional
interests). See generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as
a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972) (analyzing the Court’s role in enforcing constitu-
tional guarantees); Monaghan, supra note 23 (recognizing remedial rules as part of constitu-
tional common law).
31 See infra Part IV. But cf. David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 639, 660 (2008) (“The law of constitutional remedies is almost entirely a matter
of judge-made federal ‘constitutional common law,’ informed largely by the twin aims of re-
dressing constitutional violations on an individual level and ensuring that government officials
obey constitutional norms.” (footnote omitted)).
32 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1778 (noting that remedies for constitutional
violations have come through legal and equitable forms such as “damages, restitution, injunc-
tions, mandamus, ejectment, declaratory judgments, exclusion of evidence, remand for retrial
or reconsideration untainted by constitutional error, and writs of habeas corpus”).
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treatment, for example, to injunctions, declaratory judgments, or writs of mandamus
or prohibition when I am discussing remedies that have the effect of causing a gov-
ernment actor to desist unconstitutional conduct or refrain from an imminent vio-
lation of rights. Rather, I group all such forms of relief together under more general
headings such as “Nullification of Unconstitutional Laws by Subjects of Government
Enforcement Actions” and “Remedies Ameliorating Other Ongoing or Imminent
Constitutional Violations.”33
II. A FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
A. A Need to Escape History
Although the historical practice of classifying remedies as either “legal” or
“equitable” remains the norm, the historical practice often confuses far more than it
clarifies. Professor Douglas Laycock, a leading expert on the law of remedies, explains
why this is so:
The line between law and equity is largely the result of a
bureaucratic fight for turf; each set of courts [i.e., the separate law
and equity courts that existed both in England and throughout the
United States prior to last century’s merger of law and equity]
took as much jurisdiction as it could get. Consequently, the line is
jagged and not especially functional; it can only be memorized.
Damages are the most important legal remedy; in general, com-
pensatory and punitive remedies are legal. Injunctions and specific
performance decrees are the most important equitable remedies;
some of the specialized coercive remedies, such as mandamus,
prohibition, and habeas corpus, are legal. Declaratory judgments
were created by statute after the merger, so they are not classified
either way; most of the older, more specialized declaratory rem-
edies are equitable. Restitution was developed independently in
both sets of courts; some restitutionary remedies are legal, some
equitable, and some both.34
In an earlier edition of his casebook,35 Laycock illustrated how use of the histor-
ical law/equity distinction can cause practical problems by contrasting the Supreme
Court’s 1993 decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates36 with its 2002 decision in
33 See infra Parts II.B.2.a–b.
34 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 6.
35 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (3d ed. 2002).
36 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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Great-West Life & Annuity Co. v. Knudson.37 In Mertens, the Court by a 5–4 vote
construed Congress’s use of the phrase “equitable relief” in Section 502(a)(3) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)38 to encompass only
remedies “that are typically available in equity,” and not all remedies actually avail-
able in an equity court prior to the merger.39 But in Great-West, Laycock persuasively
demonstrates, the Court (again, in a 5–4 split) effectively adopted the latter, more
technical meaning of the very same statutory provision.40
Laycock uses this discussion of Mertens and Great-West to illustrate two broader
themes that pervade his work. First, it often would be far more useful if Congress,
judges, and commentators were to use functional, rather than historical, law/equity lan-
guage when classifying constitutional remedies.41 Second, functionally speaking, “[t]he
most fundamental remedial choice is between substitutionary and specific remedies.”42
I agree. Therefore, in order to lay the groundwork for the analysis and arguments that
follow, I start by classifying recognized constitutional remedies in functional terms,
as either substitutionary or specific. Hopefully, the utility of this functional classifi-
cation scheme will become apparent as readers proceed through the rest of the paper.
37 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
38 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
(2006)). Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA may be found at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
39 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (noting that “[a]s memories of the divided bench, and famil-
iarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the past,” it is less likely that Congress
intended that the phrase “equitable remedies” be construed with historical precision).
40 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 568–69. I emphasize that this is Laycock’s charac-
terization of Great-West because the majority’s opinion acknowledges no departure from
Mertens. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinions in both Mertens and Great-
West, and sought throughout the latter to emphasize its consistency with the former. See Great-
West, 534 U.S. at 209–20.
41 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 3.
42 Id. at 5 (quoting LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 12–13). Of course, remedies may also be
classified as either prospective or retrospective, depending on how they operate. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), employed this distinction to differentiate between those injunc-
tions requiring the expenditure of state funds that may lawfully be entered against state officials
under the doctrine recognized in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and those that are
effectively suits against the State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman
concluded that the Eleventh Amendment permits prospective injunctions of this sort but bars
injunctions that operate retrospectively. See 415 U.S. at 664–70. The distinction between pro-
spective and retrospective remedies has proved to be quite difficult to draw and rationalize
in practice. See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 475 (“The line between prospective and
retrospective remedies is neither self-evident nor self-executing.”); Amar, supra note 14, at
1480 (describing the Supreme Court’s cases in the area as “incoherent”); Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 88
& n.353 (1988) (noting the “numerous grounds” on which the distinction has been criticized);
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the
Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 3
(1998) (noting the distinction’s “inadequacies”).
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B. Substitutionary and Specific Constitutional Remedies
There is an initial need to define terms. Laycock describes the difference between
substitutionary and specific remedies as follows:
With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and receives
a sum of money. Specific remedies seek to avoid this exchange.
They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it, rather than let it happen
and compensate for it. They seek to prevent harm to plaintiff, re-
pair the harm in kind, or restore the specific thing that plaintiff
lost. Substitutionary remedies include compensatory damages,
attorneys’ fees, restitution of the money value of defendant’s gain,
and punitive damages. Specific remedies include injunctions, spe-
cific performance of contracts, restitution of specific property,
and restitution of a specific sum of money.43
Laycock’s descriptive definitions of substitutionary and specific remedies are
typical,44 and they are helpful as far as they go. But typical definitions of substitutionary
and specific remedies such as these are incomplete and inadequate for wholesale appli-
cation in the unique context of constitutional remedies. For example, typical definitions
may be taken to suggest that money is the only substitutionary remedy.45 Yet this is
inaccurate. Non-monetary substitutionary injunctions are sometimes available,46 and
there are other substitutionary constitutional remedies that are non-monetary.47 In addi-
tion, substitutionary remedies are not inevitably compensatory, as typical definitions
43 LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 12–13.
44 See Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a “Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 122–23
& nn.14–15 (2006) (collecting common definitions); see also id. at 122–23 (“The difference be-
tween specific and substitutionary remedies can be further understood in terms of the plaintiff’s
rightful position—the position the plaintiff would hold if the defendant did not violate the
plaintiff’s legal rights. Specific relief achieves the plaintiff’s rightful position exactly; substi-
tutionary relief achieves only a rough approximation.”).
45 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 6; see also Murphy, supra note 44, at 124 & n.22 (citing
JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 2[b], at 4 (1999)) (noting that Fischer gives
only damages as an example of a substitutionary remedy); id. (citing ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET
AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 1 (7th ed. 2005)) (stating that sub-
stitutionary relief substitutes money for specific relief ).
46 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 850 n.2 (2d ed.
1990) (“[S]ubstitutional relief could, in theory, be in kind rather than in money.”); Murphy,
supra note 44, at 124 & n.25 (providing as an example a nonmonetary substitutionary injunc-
tion ordering that a person unlawfully denied a promotion be placed in a different position
because the position she sought had since been filled); see also infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing
structural reform injunctions rooted in constitutional violations that exceed the scope of the
violation that justified judicial intervention).
47 See infra Parts II.B.1.b–c (discussing the exclusion of evidence at trial and reversal of
judgments tainted by constitutional error).
866 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:857
can be read to imply; they may be justified entirely by public policy goals unrelated
to harm suffered by the right-holder, as is the case with the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule.48
For purposes of understanding the classification scheme that follows, an instru-
mental definition that focuses on the difference between substitutionary and specific
remedies will be more useful. Borrowing from Professor Colleen Murphy, I adopt the
following as my working definition: “[S]pecific remedies provide the original thing or
condition to which the [claimant] was entitled, while substitutionary remedies provide
something else.”49 Under this definition, specific constitutional remedies permit a right-
holder to halt an ongoing, or avoid an imminent, unconstitutional deprivation of life,
liberty, or property; in other words, they provide or restore to the right-holder the very
freedom, interest, or thing that the Constitution promises. Substitutionary constitutional
remedies, by contrast, provide “something else” to victims of constitutional violations—
usually (although not always50) because the violation is wholly realized by the time it
is raised in court and therefore cannot be headed off, halted, or undone.51
1. Substitutionary Constitutional Remedies
a. Damages
Even though a judgment ordering the defendant to pay money to the plaintiff is not
the only substitutionary constitutional remedy, it is the prototypical example of sub-
stitutionary relief. Victims of constitutional violations are sometimes entitled to seek
damage awards from federal actors under the Bivens doctrine52 and more frequently
48 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974) (rejecting the theory that
Fourth Amendment exclusion is a “personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved” and
emphasizing that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct “to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally”).
49 Murphy, supra note 44, at 126; see also FISCHER, supra note 45, at § 2.2 (“A substi-
tutional remedy is something other than a specific remedy.”).
50 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
51 See Murphy, supra note 44, at 137–38 & n.11 (explaining that remedies for harms that
have accrued prior to the date of a judgment are usually substitutionary).
52 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (authorizing plaintiffs
to vindicate certain constitutionally protected rights by means of a damages action against fed-
eral officials sued in their individual capacities). A Bivens claim lies directly under the consti-
tutional provision in question and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), which confers on the federal courts
jurisdiction over claims “arising under the Constitution.” See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 16 (1980). Since 1980, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to permit the assertion
of Bivens claims in any context other than the three that were authorized between 1971 and
1980: Fourth Amendment violations, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, gender discrimination, see
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979); and deliberate indifference to medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16–18 (1980). See Minneci v.
Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 622–23 (2012) (detailing five cases from 1983 to 2012 in which the
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entitled to do so from state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.53 Such suits, which may
initially be filed in either federal or state court, usually name as defendants the indi-
vidual government actor who was the agent through whom the federal, state, or local
government visited constitutional harm on the plaintiff.54 Such “individual capacity”
actions are pervasive because sovereign immunity shields the federal government
from damages claims under Bivens55 and because states and their subdivisions are not
“persons” subject to suit within the meaning of Section 1983.56 In fact, the only type
of government entity subject to a suit for money damages for an alleged constitutional
violation is a unit of local government such as a municipality.57 But local government
units are not liable for the conduct of their employees under a theory of respondeat
superior.58 Rather, they are subject to Section 1983 liability only when the plaintiff’s
injuries have been caused by an unlawful “policy or custom”59—a concept that has been
narrowly defined and is therefore quite difficult to prove.60 Thus, as already noted, most
constitutional claims for money name individual defendants.61
Court refused to recognize a Bivens claim and rejecting the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment
claim). It has cautioned that judicial implication of a damages remedy for constitutional viola-
tions should not proceed if there exist alternative processes for protecting the constitutionally
recognized interest, including state tort law. See id. at 621 (applying analysis prescribed in
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). And even where such alternative processes do
not exist, courts should heed any special factors that counsel hesitation on the part of a common
law tribunal to authorize a new kind of federal litigation. See id. For an excellent overview of
recent developments in Bivens jurisprudence, and for an intriguing proposal to set this body
of jurisprudence on a straighter course, see James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009).
53 In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
54 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (considering a suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a prison correctional officer in federal court).
55 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
56 See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
57 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 700 (1978) (overruling Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187–91 (1961), and holding that municipalities are “persons” subject
to suit under Section 1983).
58 See id. at 691.
59 See id. at 694–95.
60 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 463–64 & n.226 (2002); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1999).
61 Although constitutionally based money judgments tend to run nominally against indi-
vidual defendants, the government agency that employs the individual will almost invariably
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Civil rights plaintiffs are entitled to seek compensatory and punitive damages under
Bivens62 and Section 1983,63 except that punitive damages are unavailable in a claim
against a municipality.64 Civil rights plaintiffs may also recover attorney’s fees for a
successful claim under Section 1983,65 but not for a successful claim under Bivens.66
b. The Exclusion of Evidence Obtained as a Result of a Wholly Realized
Constitutional Violation
The exclusion of evidence at trial in either federal or state court can either consti-
tute a remedy for a wholly realized constitutional wrong or work to head off an immi-
nent constitutional violation. Professor Arnold Loewy provides a succinct explanation
of why this is so:
The exclusion of police-obtained evidence at a criminal trial
can be justified by one of two theories. Under one theory, evidence
is excluded because the police have unconstitutionally obtained the
evidence and exclusion is thought desirable to deter such police
behavior in the future by precluding a substantial benefit from such
misconduct. Under the other theory, the evidence is excluded be-
cause the Constitution guarantees the defendant a procedural right
to exclude the evidence. The former theory focuses on the con-
stitutional impropriety of obtaining the evidence, while the latter
theory’s focus is on the constitutional impropriety of using that
evidence at trial.67
supply the defendant with a defense, and will commonly foot the bill for an adverse judgment.
State agencies and municipalities commonly take out insurance policies that oblige the in-
surer to defend and indemnify state and municipal employees against such claims. See John M.
Greabe, Iqbal, al-Kidd, and Pleading Past Qualified Immunity: What the Cases Mean and
How They Demonstrate a Need to Eliminate the Immunity Doctrines from Constitutional Tort
Law, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 31 n.187 (2011). The federal government, in contrast,
typically supplies a federal government attorney to defend individual employees sued under
Bivens. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2010)). But there are opt-out provisions that can
lead to the government supplying private counsel for Bivens defendants if a conflict arises be-
tween the defendant’s interests and the interests of the United States. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R.
§§ 50.15(a)(8), 50.15(a)(11)(ii–iii), 50.16(a) (2010)).
62 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21–22 (1980).
63 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
64 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
66 See, e.g., Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1994).
67 Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 907, 907 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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Put in remedial terms, the act of exclusion under the former theory constitutes substi-
tutionary relief for a wholly realized constitutional violation committed at the time the
evidence was obtained.68 But the act of exclusion under the latter theory permits the
moving party to receive that to which she is specifically entitled under the Constitution:
avoidance of the procedural constitutional violation that would occur upon admission
of the evidence.69
The exclusion of evidence at trial has long been recognized in connection with vio-
lations of the Fourth,70 Fifth,71 and Sixth Amendments,72 and the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.73 For example, the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained by federal agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment was first required nearly
a century ago in Weeks v. United States74 and was extended by the Warren Court to
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state agents in Mapp v.
Ohio.75 The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional rule an-
nounced in Miranda v. Arizona,76 fashioned to protect Fifth- and Sixth-Amendment
rights,77 was authorized in Miranda itself.78 The exclusion of evidence otherwise ob-
tained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments also is well established,79 as
68 Of course, the erroneous admission of evidence obtained as a consequence of the earlier
constitutional violation could establish or contribute to a second constitutional violation—a
deprivation of the right to a fair trial. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)
(“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”). Such a
wholly realized second constitutional violation can also only be remedied post hoc through the
provision of a substitutionary remedy—reversal of any judgment of conviction that might follow
the erroneous admission of evidence—on direct or collateral review. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
69 It seems odd to classify such an act of exclusion as a “remedy” because no constitutional
violation has occurred and the situation is not analogous to a claim for pre-enforcement review
of an unconstitutional statute that a government official has declared an intention to enforce.
See infra Parts II.B.1.a–b.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.”).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (guaranteeing an accused “due process of law”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (same).
74 See 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
75 See 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
76 See 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court made clear that Miranda is a constitu-
tional rule in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
77 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442–44.
78 See id. at 476–77.
79 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170–74 (1985) (excluding evidence obtained
through interrogation by state officials in violation of the right to assistance of counsel); Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398–99 (1978) (excluding incriminating statements unlawfully coerced
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is the exclusion under the Due Process Clauses of unreliable eyewitness evidence
obtained through police misconduct.80
A violation of the Fourth Amendment is wholly realized at the time the unlawful
search or seizure is conducted.81 So is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel under the rule recognized in Massiah v. United States.82 Some coerced con-
fessions—for example, those whose brutality stands as an independent constitutional
violation, irrespective of whether evidence obtained as a consequence of the episode
is subsequently admitted at trial—likely fall into this same category; others likely do
not.83 Thus, judicial orders excluding evidence obtained in violation of either the Fourth
Amendment or the Sixth Amendment rule protected by Massiah, or excluding confes-
sions obtained in consequence of interrogations that violate the Constitution, provide
substitutionary relief.
By contrast, if only the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda
rule constitutes a constitutional violation,84 a judicial order excluding such evidence
would avoid the violation.85 This is clearly the case with, for example, a ruling, order,
or instruction protecting a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights
under the rule established in Crawford v. Washington.86 The same is true with a rul-
ing, order, or instruction protecting a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination under the rules established in Griffin v. California.87 Note
by state officials); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239–41 (1967) (excluding identifica-
tion secured at post-indictment lineup at which counsel was not present); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (excluding evidence obtained through interrogation by federal
officials in violation of the right to assistance of counsel); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
542–43 (1897) (excluding incriminating statements unlawfully coerced by federal officials).
80 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723–25 (2012) (summarizing Supreme
Court cases involving unreliable eyewitness testimony secured through police misconduct).
81 See Loewy, supra note 67, at 908–16.
82 377 U.S. at 206. The Supreme Court held that a Massiah violation is completed at the
time of the unlawful interrogation in Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009).
83 See Loewy, supra note 67, at 933–37.
84 The Supreme Court has not decided whether a constitutional Miranda violation is com-
plete at the time of the unlawful police conduct, or whether it becomes complete only with the
admission at trial of evidence secured in violation of the required warnings. A plurality of the
Court has taken the latter view, but the proposition has yet to garner majority support. See
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767, 772–73 (2003) (plurality opinion).
85 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
86 See 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (finding out-of-court, testimonial witness statements in-
admissible unless the witness is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness). Imagine here a judicial order barring the prosecution from using such
a statement or instructing the jury to ignore any evidence of such a statement that might have
been presented to it.
87 See 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (barring a prosecutor from asking the jury to draw an ad-
verse inference from a criminal defendant’s refusal to testify and barring a judge from in-
structing the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn from such silence). Imagine here
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also that the issue does not arise only in the criminal law context. To take a final ex-
ample, a ruling, order, or instruction that works to protect the defendant from a jury
award that would work a denial of due process under the rule announced in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams88 also avoids a procedural constitutional violation.89
The foregoing examples serve only to illustrate; they do not provide an exhaus-
tive account of the range of possible scenarios in which requests for the exclusion
of evidence or for the preclusion of argument or instruction raise issues of constitu-
tional dimension.
c. Reversal of a Judgment Infected by Constitutional Error
As discussed in the preceding subsection, litigants often ask federal and state trial
judges to provide substitutionary constitutional remedies and to issue rulings that en-
force procedural guarantees that are based in the Constitution.90 But what if a trial judge
errs by admitting evidence that she should not have admitted and then subsequently
enters a judgment that is adverse to the right-holder? Or what if a prosecutor or a crim-
inal defense attorney acts to deprive a right-holder of procedural guarantees based in the
Constitution,91 and (again) a judgment subsequently enters that is adverse to the right-
holder? Or what if the trial itself is marred by a constitutional error such as, to take only
one of many possible examples, a jury instruction that effectively relieves the prosecu-
tion of its burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt?92
Whenever one of these things happens, a “constitutional” wrong has been com-
mitted.93 In such circumstances, there is a wide array of procedural mechanisms that
a judicial order instructing the jury to disregard a comment by the prosecutor that violated
the rule established in Griffin.
88 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
89 See id. at 353–55 (finding that a damage award punishing a defendant for injuring non-
parties constitutes a taking of property without due process). Imagine here an instruction inform-
ing a jury presented with evidence that defendant’s conduct harmed non-parties that it cannot
punish the defendant for harm done to non-parties. Cf. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514
U.S. 749 (1995) (holding that petitioner was not subject to a state law tolling provision that
was struck down on constitutional grounds while a lawsuit against petitioner was pending).
90 See supra Part II.B.1.b.
91 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523–34 (2003) (finding that failure of defense
counsel in a capital case to investigate the defendant’s life history for mitigating evidence be-
yond that discovered by government agencies constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding that
a prosecutor’s withholding of evidence material to the guilt or innocence of the accused is
a violation of due process).
92 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979) (stating that jury instruction
may not use evidentiary presumptions that relieve the government of its burden under Winship);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the government must prove each element
of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
93 The erroneous admission of evidence previously obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment does not itself comprise a second constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States
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the right-holder may use to request reversal of the tainted judgment if she has pre-
served her claim for review.94 The right-holder may, for example, seek relief from the
trial court itself.95 Or the right-holder may directly appeal the judgment and request
reversal from an appellate court.96 And in the case of a criminal judgment, the right-
holder may also seek relief by means of a collateral attack on the tainted judgment.97
Any relief obtained pursuant to such a procedural mechanism is substitutionary be-
cause the constitutional violation being challenged is concluded at the time of the post
hoc challenge and because trials are not fungible.98 Any new trial (or decision not to
initiate a second trial) following an order reversing the judgment thus functions as a
substitute for the wholly realized constitutional wrong.
d. Provisions of Structural Reform Injunctions That Are Unnecessary to
Prevent or Undo a Constitutional Violation
In the decades since the Supreme Court’s merits decision and remedial ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education,99 the Court has upheld a number of lower court struc-
tural reform injunctions that have been based on findings that the conditions prevalent
in state and local institutions such as school districts, prisons, mental hospitals, and
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (noting that the Constitution does not require the exclu-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But the Supreme Court
analyzes such an error as “constitutional” for purposes of harmless error review. See Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–07 (1991) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52–53
(1970)) (affirming the use of a constitutional harmless-error analysis).
94 If she has not preserved her claim, she may still argue that the error was plain and there-
fore susceptible to being noticed notwithstanding her procedural default. See FED. R. CIV. P.
51(d)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)
(elaborating on the unforgiving “plain error” standard).
95 To avoid unnecessary prolixity, I confine my exemplary citations in this footnote and the
next two to federal mechanisms available to seek reversal of a judgment infected by constitu-
tional error. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (new trial or alteration or amendment of a judgment);
FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (relief from judgment or order); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (acquittal); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 33 (new trial). Obviously, parallel procedural mechanisms are available in each state.
96 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (authorizing appeals from final decisions of federal
district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006) (authorizing appeals from some interlocutory decisions
of the federal district courts). Federal appeals are governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, FED. R. APP. P. 1(a)(1), and, in the event further review is sought in the U.S.
Supreme Court, by the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. R. 48(2).
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (authorizing collateral attack on state judgments); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (2006) (authorizing collateral attack on federal judgments).
98 Cf. infra Part II.B.2.e (describing how a restitutionary tax refund, owed as a matter of
due process, constitutes specific relief ameliorating the ongoing wrongful denial of a post-
deprivation remedy for the imposition of an unconstitutional tax).
99 See Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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housing authorities have violated the individual constitutional rights of the plaintiffs
and, in the case of class actions, of the plaintiff class.100 These injunctions have required
comprehensive changes to the defendant institutions.101 Many provisions of the struc-
tural decrees that the Court has upheld, at least in the decades immediately following
Brown, required relief that went well beyond preventing or undoing the underlying
constitutional violation that justified judicial intervention.102 Whether such provisions
remain lawful today is, at best, an open question. In recent years, the Court has repeat-
edly emphasized that structural reform injunctions should be restorative in that they
should seek only to place victims in the position they rightfully would have held but
for the identified violation of the Constitution.103 In any event, to the extent that injunc-
tions may still lawfully contain provisions that outrun the scope of the underlying con-
stitutional violation, such provisions are “substitutionary” in the sense that they provide
the plaintiffs with something other than that to which the Constitution specifically
entitles them.104
100 The paradigmatic cases from the school desegregation context are Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1971), and Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437–38 (1968). Examples of cases from the other contexts mentioned may be found in
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1029–52 (2004).
101 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 100, at 1022–52. In the areas of police abuse, however, the
changes have come mostly from congressional mandates and public disapprobation. See id. at
1043–47; cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 329 (“[T]he federal courts supervised the reform . . .
in nearly every state.”).
102 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 311 (observing that Swann contained provisions that
far exceeded the underlying constitutional violation); id. at 330 (discussing a provision of the
injunction upheld in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), which prohibited Arkansas prisons
from placing inmates into punitive isolation for more than 30 days); Chayes, supra note 10, at
1302; see also Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 1387; Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts
as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 949, 955–58 (1978).
103 See LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 310–36 (discussing how the law evolved in this direction
in cases such as Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down an injunction that
ordered a multi-district desegregation remedy when only one school district had been adjudged
a constitutional violator); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (striking down injunction
that contained provisions that went far beyond restoring victims of unlawful segregation to
the position they would have occupied absent such conduct); and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343 (1996) (similar, with respect to an injunction that ordered significant upgrades to prison
law libraries in Arizona)). Even in the Court’s recent decision upholding an injunction requir-
ing California to reduce its prison population, the rhetoric of necessity and narrow tailoring
permeates the majority’s analysis. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011)
(noting that “courts may enter orders placing limits on a prison’s population” when doing so
is “necessary to ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate”); id. at 1940 (noting that the
Court has “rejected remedial orders that unnecessarily reach out to improve prison conditions
other than those that violate the Constitution”); id. at 1944 (“Of course, courts must not confuse
professional standards with constitutional requirements.”).
104 See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Murphy, supra note 44, at 124–26
& n.26 (characterizing as substitutionary a structural reform injunction ordering the building
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2. Specific Constitutional Remedies
a. Nullification of Unconstitutional Laws by Subjects of Government
Enforcement Actions
There is no more basic and essential remedy for the violation of a constitutional
right than a holding in favor of the subject of a government enforcement action that the
federal or state law by which the government proceeds is unconstitutional, either on
its face or as applied to the subject.105 In the paradigmatic case, the subject is charged
with a crime or subjected to a coercive civil enforcement action and asserts defensively
the unconstitutionality of the law (again, facially or as applied) by which the govern-
ment proceeds.106 Famous examples of such cases include United States v. Lopez107 and
Brandenburg v. Ohio.108 Alternatively, the subject of an imminent enforcement action
sometimes may, without facing a sovereign immunity bar (in the case of a claim against
a federal official)109 or an Eleventh Amendment bar (in the case of a claim against a
of recreational facilities at a prison as a remedy for past unlawful overcrowding in violation of
the Eighth Amendment).
105 See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 718; Jeffries & Rutherglen,
supra note 10, at 1391–92.
106 See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 1391–92.
107 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (overturning a conviction under the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act because the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to pass the Act).
108 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning a conviction under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Statute
because the Statute violated the First Amendment on its face).
109 The second sentence of Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006) (APA), has been widely read to waive sovereign immunity with respect to official capac-
ity claims against federal officials. Section 702 provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court
of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating
a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed
to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the
United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
Id. That said, it is not entirely settled whether Section 702 of the APA waives sovereign im-
munity broadly, or only with respect to actions against federal officials that are brought under
other provisions of the APA. But the recent and consistent trend in the federal courts of appeals
has been to read the second sentence of Section 702 as a broad waiver of immunity and not one
limited solely to actions brought under the APA. See, e.g., Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, 684 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that APA waivers are not limited to actions
brought under the Act); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir.
2011) (subjecting federal officials to state common law through the APA), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (allowing sovereign immunity to apply in patent law claims); Veterans for Common
Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 866 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the Veterans Administration unable
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state official),110 seek pre-enforcement review by means of a prospective federal action
against the government official(s) poised to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional law.
Such actions may proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act111 so long as they are
otherwise justiciable and proper.112 When asserting one’s rights in this way, either de-
fensively or offensively, the subject of the enforcement action seeks the specific rem-
edy of freedom from the unconstitutional constraint or coercion that would be worked
by the challenged statute if it were enforced against the right-holder.113
b. Remedies Ameliorating Other Ongoing or Imminent Constitutional
Violations
Victims of unconstitutional conduct may also seek prospective relief against gov-
ernment officials acting in their official capacities to ameliorate other ongoing or immi-
nent violations of individual constitutional rights114 (i.e., ongoing or imminent violations
to invoke sovereign immunity against a constitutional claim), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 678
F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012); Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2007)
(applying waiver to any official action), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008).
110 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar injunctive relief against state officials who act, or will act imminently, in violation of
the Constitution, and authorizing shareholders of a railroad subject to an imminent enforce-
ment proceeding to enjoin by way of derivative suit the state official who was poised to enforce
allegedly unconstitutional rate regulations).
111 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006). The Act provides that, in a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction, and subject to listed exceptions, “any court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Id.
112 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937) (requiring an “actual”
controversy). Such actions typically face substantial hurdles under doctrines such as standing,
ripeness, and abstention, and they are not common. But they do exist and are not impossible
to win. Cf. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 725 (acknowledging
there is “little clear authority for a general right to obtain anticipatory relief”). Compare, e.g.,
Seegars v. Gonzalez, 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting on justiciability grounds a
pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of District of Columbia firearms regulatory
statutes), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006), with Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272
(6th Cir. 1997) (permitting portions of such a challenge to the constitutionality of provisions
of the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to proceed).
113 If the trial court denies the remedy, the subject may challenge the ruling on appeal or col-
lateral review under procedural mechanisms such as those described in Part II.B.1.c. Obviously,
an appeal or collateral attack on the judgment that succeeds in arguing for facial or as-applied
nullification of the statute authorizing the underlying enforcement action provides the specific
relief that the trial court should have provided. Therefore, such a successful appeal or collateral
attack on the judgment differs qualitatively from the successful appeals and collateral attacks
that yield substitutionary relief and are described in Part II.B.1.c.
114 I emphasize that the entitlement is to ameliorate violations of individual constitutional
rights because the current Supreme Court has recently evinced a reluctance to recognize such
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other than the initiation or imminent initiation of an enforcement action under an un-
constitutional law).115 As with a damages claim under Bivens, this type of action lies
under the constitutional provision in question and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when it is brought
against a federal agent.116 When a state agent is the target, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes
the filing of such a claim.117
Here again, plaintiffs may avoid any sovereign or Eleventh Amendment immunity
bar so long as they seek truly prospective relief against government officials acting
in their official capacities.118 Webster v. Doe119 constitutes a paradigmatic example of
such a claim against federal officials.120 The lawsuits demanding the structural reform
of state and local public institutions, discussed above,121 constitute paradigmatic ex-
amples of such claims against state officials under Section 1983. Of course, as already
mentioned, the remedial decrees in this latter group of cases sometimes contained pro-
visions that went beyond undoing or preventing the constitutional violation that war-
ranted judicial intervention in the first instance.122 But to the extent that the decrees
also caused the responsible local officials to ameliorate the condition or conditions con-
stituting the ongoing or imminent constitutional violation, whether by refraining from
unconstitutional conduct or affirmatively undertaking constitutionally required action,
they provided the plaintiffs (or the plaintiff class) with specific relief. Such relief is
properly regarded as specific because it has the effect of freeing the plaintiffs from the
effects of the ongoing or imminent invasion of their constitutional rights and restoring
them to the position they rightfully would have held but for the constitutional violation.
actions to enforce structural constitutional provisions such as the Supremacy Clause. See
Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1077.pdf (discussing the implications of Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1204 (2012), which would have denied the plaintiffs the right to bring an action to enjoin state
Medicaid laws that were alleged to have been preempted by the federal Medicaid statute).
115 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
116 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
413 F.3d 1225, 1230–33 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining in detail how and why plaintiffs may seek
prospective relief against federal officials for violations of constitutional rights directly under
the Constitution pursuant to Section 1331).
117 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Even prior to the revivification of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 worked by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), it was understood that actions for
prospective relief against state officers to halt ongoing or imminent constitutional violations
were available in federal court, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and in state court,
see General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
118 See supra notes 42 & 109–10 and accompanying text.
119 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
120 See id. at 596, 601–05 (seeking specific remedy of reinstatement to employment by fed-
eral agency for claimed unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by
federal officials).
121 See supra Part II.B.1.d.
122 See id.
2013] CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST BALANCING 877
c. Habeas Corpus
The specific remedy of nullification of unconstitutional laws by subjects of gov-
ernment enforcement actions, discussed above,123 is available when the government
has either formally commenced enforcement proceedings or, if the subject files suit
in anticipation of enforcement proceedings, is sufficiently likely to do so to render
an anticipatory action justiciable.124 But what if the government simply detains an
individual without filing charges or providing the individual with access to a judicial
officer? In such a situation, the detained individual is constitutionally entitled to access
to a judicial officer to contest the detention by means of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus (or any effectual substitute Congress devises).125 Habeas corpus is available
in such circumstances as a matter of constitutional right so long as (1) Congress has
not lawfully suspended its availability, and (2) the petitioner would have had access
to the writ under the same or similar circumstances in 1789.126 The availability of ac-
cess to a judicial officer through the writ of habeas corpus127 is therefore a specific rem-
edy authorized by the Constitution—one of two such remedies that the Constitution
explicitly mentions.
d. “Just Compensation” for Takings
The other specific remedy that the Constitution explicitly mentions is found in the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.128 The Fifth Amendment’s Just
123 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
124 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (adopting a ripeness standard for
evaluating the justiciability of a claim seeking pre-enforcement review).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006) (authorizing federal Justices and judges to issue writs of habeas corpus).
126 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246–48 (2008) (explaining “‘at the absolute
minimum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))).
127 This constitutionally contemplated form of habeas corpus, available under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (2006), should be distinguished from collateral review habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2006) (collateral review of state judgments) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (collateral
review of federal judgments). These latter forms of habeas corpus are statutory creations and,
as discussed above, usually serve as vehicles for the delivery of substitutionary relief. See supra
Part II.B.1.c.
128 See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 719 (“The text [of the
Constitution] refers explicitly to remedies in only two instances. First, the remedy of habeas
corpus is safeguarded against ‘suspension’ by Congress. Second, the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment ‘dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting
to a taking’—compensation for the impairment of value.” (citation omitted) (quoting First
English Evangelican Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987))).
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Compensation Clause is set forth within its broader Takings Clause, which states that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”129
It is important to bear in mind that the just compensation mandated by the Takings
Clause is not a substitutionary remedy for an earlier, wholly realized constitutional
violation. It is, rather, a specific remedy that the government must supply whenever
it has “taken” property for public use.130 Put another way, the constitutional violation
does not occur upon the alleged taking; it takes place only if and when the govern-
ment fails to provide the “just compensation” that the Constitution mandates in the
event of a taking. Thus, a takings claim is in fact a claim for the specific constitu-
tional remedy of “just compensation.”
e. A Post-Deprivation Remedy for the Prior Coercive Collection of an
Unconstitutional Tax, Custom, or Duty
There is a distinct class of cases that involve claims for the provision of a post-
deprivation remedy for the prior collection of unconstitutional taxes or assessments.
The most common such remedy is a tax refund, such as that ordered in Ward v. Love
County.131 Another remedy, potentially available in cases where a tax is held to violate
equal protection or dormant commerce clause principles by treating plaintiffs unfairly
vis-à-vis another class of taxpayers, is the retroactive imposition of an equalizing tax
on the previously favored taxpayers, such as that discussed in McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco.132 Some combination of the two also
is permissible.133
Claims for the provision of a post-deprivation tax remedy should be distinguished
from claims in which a taxpayer seeks the specific remedy of nullification of an
unconstitutional tax or the specific remedy of injunctive or declaratory relief invali-
dating the unconstitutional tax itself.134 Claims for post-deprivation relief of the sort
129 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130 See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985) (observing that the Takings Clause “does not proscribe the taking of property; it pro-
scribes taking without just compensation”).
131 See 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (ordering a county to refund monies paid under a tax that the
county commissioners lacked the constitutional power to enforce).
132 See 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (holding that the remedy for such a tax should be either a refund
of the constitutionally excessive portion of the taxes paid or, to the extent otherwise con-
sistent with the Constitution, the assessment and collection of back taxes on the previously
favored class).
133 See id. at 39–41.
134 See supra Parts II.B.2.a–b. Such claims are often precluded by statute. State law fre-
quently requires taxpayers who object to a tax on constitutional grounds to pay first and to
litigate later, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1043, and the fed-
eral Tax Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from interfering with such state schemes, see
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (limiting federal court jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of state
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described in this subsection can of course be joined with claims attacking the consti-
tutionality of the tax itself (when such claims are permitted).135 But the claims them-
selves are separate and distinct, and a claimant’s entitlement to a means for obtaining
a remedy, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, is separately rooted in the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process.136
Why should a claim seeking a post-deprivation remedy for the prior coercive col-
lection of an unconstitutional tax be regarded as seeking specific rather than substitu-
tionary relief, given that the unlawful assessment and coercive collection are wholly
concluded at the time the taxpayer seeks a post hoc remedy? The answer lies in the fact
that the Supreme Court has identified the due process guarantee, and not the constitu-
tional provision that the unlawful tax violated, as the source of the taxpayer’s entitle-
ment to a remedy.137 A taxpayer who has paid an unconstitutional tax and is seeking a
post-deprivation remedy as a matter of constitutional right—because the taxing en-
tity has not provided her with a positive law mechanism for obtaining post-deprivation
taxes); see also infra Part III.B.1. Moreover, the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a) (2006), prohibits any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or col-
lection of any tax” unless the suit falls within one of fourteen specified exceptions.
135 See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (involving (1) a
claim that a tax on stock violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was higher than the
tax imposed on the stock of competing domestic corporations, and (2) a separate request for
a refund of the unconstitutionally excessive portion of the tax).
136 See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1994) (observing that “a denial by a state
court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United
States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sovereign
immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 110 (noting that “the sovereign immunity
States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment, does generally bar tax refund
claims from being brought in that forum” (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of
Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945))).
In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), which held that Congress may not subject states
to suit in their own courts absent their consent, the majority gave the recently and unanimously
decided Reich a mysteriously narrow reading. The majority characterized the case as having
held only that,
[D]espite its immunity from suit in federal court, a State which holds out
what plainly appears to be “a clear and certain” postdeprivation remedy
for taxes collected in violation of federal law may not declare, after dis-
puted taxes have been paid in reliance on this remedy, that the remedy
does not in fact exist.
Id. at 740. For a discussion of how to read Reich in light of Alden, see FALLON ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 721.
137 Litigation has focused on the constitutionality of state rather than federal schemes because
federal law provides a refund remedy pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006).
See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1514–15 (2008) (detailing
how a taxpayer forced to pay an unlawful federal tax must seek a refund administratively before
suing the government for a refund under the Tucker Act).
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relief on its own—is not making a direct claim for a substitutionary remedy for the
effects of the unconstitutional tax under Bivens or Section 1983. She is, rather, seeking
a constitutional entitlement that is being withheld as an ongoing matter: the due pro-
cess guarantee of an effective post-deprivation remedy for persons in her position.
And as we have seen, a request for a constitutional entitlement that is being withheld
as an ongoing matter is a request for a specific constitutional remedy.
C. Summary
From the discussion above, we see that there is a strong correlation between the
discretionary acts of individual government agents who violate the Constitution and
substitutionary constitutional remedies. Because such discretionary acts usually cannot
be challenged in real time or in advance of their occurrence,138 the violation is typically
wholly realized by the time the affected party challenges it in court. And remedies for
wholly realized constitutional violations are by their nature substitutionary.139
By contrast, we see a nearly perfect identity between ongoing unconstitutional
governmental policies and customs—governmental positions taken in statutes, regula-
tions, informal policy, and through the modus operandi of those who function as gov-
ernment policymakers—and specific constitutional remedies. Specific constitutional
remedies are by their nature available to address only ongoing or imminent violations,
and not violations that are wholly concluded. In the constitutional law context, such
ongoing or imminent violations are almost invariably worked by policies and customs
rising to the level of unconstitutional “law,” and not the discretionary unconstitutional
“conduct” of government agents. Thus, we may generalize that specific constitutional
remedies are the typical means by which courts directly140 halt ongoing or imminent
138 Limitations on the standing doctrine make anticipatory challenges of this sort nearly
impossible. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying standing to a victim of
an allegedly unconstitutional chokehold to bring a prospective challenge against the legality
of the practice).
139 There are exceptions to the generalization that claims for substitutionary relief target
wholly realized wrongs. For example, a suit for money damages against a municipality under
Section 1983 is a claim for substitutionary relief to compensate for harm caused not by the
wholly realized discretionary act of a government agent, but for the harm caused by an un-
constitutional custom or policy that may well be causing ongoing harm to the right-holder. See
supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. So too may a claim for substitutionary relief target
an unconstitutional law and not discretionary conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) (authorizing reversals of criminal convictions affected by unconstitutional
provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
140 I say “directly” because a substitutionary remedy can indirectly cause government
authorities to cease and desist in enforcing an unconstitutional policy or custom. For ex-
ample, a damage award that compensates a plaintiff for harm done by an unconstitutional
municipal custom or policy, see, e.g., supra note 139, would doubtless lead to a cessation of
the policy in question, even in the absence of a concomitant injunction striking down the
custom or policy.
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violations of constitutional rights, which usually take place in the form of some sort
of unconstitutional law (broadly defined) affecting the liberty or property interests of
the right-holder.
III. THE WITHHOLDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
A. Doctrines Limiting the Availability of Substitutionary Constitutional Remedies
For each type of substitutionary constitutional remedy available to ameliorate a
wholly realized constitutional wrong, the Supreme Court has developed one or more
doctrines that require courts to withhold remedies in circumstances where there has
been a violation of rights. And in each case, the Court has been clear that the limits it
is imposing are rooted in public interest balancing.141
1. Individual Immunity Doctrines
It is well known that the availability of damages remedies from agents of the fed-
eral government under Bivens,142 and from agents of state and local governments pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,143 is significantly circumscribed.144 As an initial matter, a
number of public officials simply do not qualify as persons subject to a claim for dam-
ages under Bivens or Section 1983; they are said be cloaked in absolute immunity.145
As matters presently stand, absolute immunity protects legislators acting in a legislative
capacity,146 judges acting in a judicial capacity,147 prosecutors acting in a prosecutorial
capacity,148 grand jurors,149 and witnesses.150
141 Obviously, by definition, provisions of structural reform injunctions that are unneces-
sary to prevent or undo a constitutional violation do not themselves “remedy” a violation of
rights, at least directly. Thus, they differ qualitatively from the other substitutionary constitu-
tional remedies discussed above. But such provisions, if permissible at all under modern
doctrine, are certainly also subject to public interest balancing. See infra Part III.A.5. So in
this respect, they are like their substitutionary remedial counterparts.
142 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
143 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
144 In this subsection, I focus on doctrines that limit the availability of a damages remedy
even where a Bivens claim is authorized. But as noted above, since 1980, the Supreme Court
has put a number of additional restrictions on the availability of the Bivens damages remedy.
See supra note 52.
145 See Greabe, supra note 61, at 36–37.
146 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
147 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967).
148 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–20 (1976).
149 See id. at 423 n.20.
150 See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (grand jury witness); Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (trial witness).
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In addition, those government actors who are not protected by absolute immunity
are entitled to a qualified immunity from suit and damages liability under Bivens and
Section 1983. Qualified immunity was originally formulated as a doctrine that protected
individual government actors from liability when their conduct, although in viola-
tion of the Constitution, met two relatively demanding requirements: (1) there existed
objectively reasonable grounds for the defendant to conclude that the challenged action
was lawful “at the time and in light of all the circumstances,”151 and (2) the defendant
acted in “good faith” and with a sincere belief that he was doing right.152 But in 1982,
the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald,153 which eliminated the require-
ment of subjective good faith and transformed the doctrine into one that protects all
defendants whose conduct was objectively reasonable in light of “clearly established”
law at the time that it was undertaken.154 The Harlow Court was candid in explaining
that it was changing the law because of an overriding policy consideration: a perceived
need to secure quicker dismissals of civil rights claims so that government actors would
not be over-deterred in performing their duties by the threats of burdensome discovery
and having to face unmeritorious claims at trial.155 In subsequent years, the Court ex-
panded the reach of the doctrine by emphasizing its broad scope156 and insisting that
courts define rights at a very high level of specificity in determining whether they are
“clearly established.”157
Finally, the Court has also strongly suggested, although it has not held, that private
parties who are not government actors, but who nonetheless stand accused of uncon-
stitutionally exercising government power under the state action doctrine, may be
entitled to avoid liability through a “good faith” defense.158 Private parties are not en-
titled to assert the specialized qualified immunity defense available to government
151 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247–48 (1974)).
152 Id.
153 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
154 See id. at 814–19 (explaining that immunity should extend to all “government officials
performing discretionary functions . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).
155 See id.
156 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that qualified immunity “provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”).
157 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987) (emphasizing that, for a right
to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right”). As Professor Alan Chen has shown, the
Court’s initial justification for the immunity doctrines—avoiding the over-deterrence of public
officials—has in recent years morphed into a more general concern about the social costs of
civil rights litigation. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J.
229, 236–37 (2006).
158 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413–14 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,
163–69 (1992).
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actors.159 But such a good faith defense would likely overlap substantially, and per-
haps be coextensive with, the qualified immunity defense.160
Because many of the cases in which these immunity doctrines were identified in-
volved claims under Section 1983,161 one might question whether it is appropriate to
label the resultant doctrines as products of judicial lawmaking rooted in public interest
balancing and not liability limits evident in, or inferable from, the text of the statute
itself. But these doctrines cannot plausibly be seen as interpretations of Section 1983.
First, many of the most important doctrinal developments in individual immunity
law have occurred in the non-statutory Bivens context and then simply been applied to
damages claims under Section 1983.162 Second, the Court has itself acknowledged that
Section 1983 “creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immu-
nities,”163 and it has explained its immunity doctrines in terms that heavily emphasize
the vital role played by public interest concerns: “[W]e have accorded certain govern-
ment officials . . . immunity . . . if the ‘tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted
in the common law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.’”164 Third,
and most importantly, the Court has been clear that, in elaborating the scope of these
immunities, it sees itself as free to advance the perceived public interest; it is not
constrained by the dictates of history and the traditions on which the immunities are
loosely based.165 The individual immunity doctrines that limit the recovery of damages
159 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166–69; see also Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1666–68
(2012) (noting the distinction between those who work for the government and “private” indi-
viduals subject to liability under Bivens and Section 1983, and applying an expansive inter-
pretation of the former category).
160 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168–69.
161 See, e.g., Richardson, 521 U.S. 399; Wyatt, 504 U.S. 158.
162 For example, Harlow’s reformulation of qualified immunity into a wholly objective
inquiry took place in the context of a Bivens claim. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
805 (1982). Also, the de facto (although unexplained) transformation of qualified immunity
from an affirmative defense into a doctrine whose inapplicability must be established as an ele-
ment of a civil rights damages claim was accomplished in a pair of recent, high profile Bivens
actions: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011). For an explanation of how Iqbal and al-Kidd worked this transformation, see Greabe,
supra note 61, at 7–22.
163 Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 163 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
164 Id. at 163–64 (emphasis added) (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
637 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644–45 (1987) (“Although it is true that we
have observed that our determinations as to the scope of official immunity are made in the
light of the ‘common-law tradition,’ we have never suggested that the precise contours of
official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the
common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by Harlow, where the Court completely re-
formulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
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in Bivens and Section 1983 actions are thus clearly the product of judicial lawmaking
rooted in public interest balancing.
2. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has developed an exclusionary rule that
presumptively requires the suppression of evidence that was obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.166 The purpose of
the rule is, of course, to deter government officials from disregarding Fourth Amend-
ment rights.167 But the Court also has held that exclusion pursuant to the rule is not a
personal constitutional right of the accused and is not inevitably warranted.168 The
Court has repeatedly invoked this latter proposition to justify a number of “exceptions”
to the rule: the “good faith” exceptions recognized in United States v. Leon,169 Illinois
v. Krull,170 Arizona v. Evans,171 and Davis v. United States;172 the broader good-faith
principle recently recognized in Herring v. United States;173 and the exception for
violations of the “knock-and-announce” rule recognized in Hudson v. Michigan.174
166 See supra notes 70 & 74–75 and accompanying text. I focus in this subsection on excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule because the withholding of the substitution-
ary constitutional remedy of exclusion has occurred most frequently in the Fourth Amendment
context. I note, however, that the Supreme Court also recently authorized an exception to the
rule requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel recognized in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), see supra notes 76 &
79 and accompanying text, when such evidence is used for impeachment purposes at trial. See
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593–94 (2009).
167 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974) (emphasizing that the ex-
clusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct).
168 See id.
169 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (authorizing the admission of evidence obtained by police officers
who reasonably rely on a faulty warrant).
170 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (authorizing the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to searches
conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes).
171 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (authorizing the admission of evidence obtained in circumstances where
police reasonably relied on erroneous information concerning an arrest warrant in a database
maintained by judicial employees).
172 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (authorizing admission of evidence obtained where police reason-
ably relied on binding judicial precedent).
173 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (authorizing the admission of evidence obtained through a merely
negligent disregard of Fourth Amendment rights, and holding that exclusion should follow
only police conduct that can be described as deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent—or that
can be traced to recurring or systemic negligence—with respect to Fourth Amendment rights).
174 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s “knock-and-
announce” rule does not require exclusion of the evidence found in the search that followed
the violation).
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Moreover, in Stone v. Powell,175 the Court held that Fourth Amendment violations
cannot ground the reversal of a state criminal judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if
the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim
in state court.176
In each instance, the Court explained that its decision to withhold a remedy for
the underlying Fourth Amendment violation was the product of cost-benefit policy
analysis. In Leon, for example, the Court stated that its decision was grounded in a
conclusion that the “substantial costs of exclusion” would outweigh the “marginal
or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively rea-
sonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.”177 Similar explanations,
all involving conclusions that the costs of exclusion would outweigh its likely deterrent
effect, may be found in Krull,178 Evans,179 Herring,180 Hudson,181 and Davis.182 The
same is so with Stone, which held that the utility of exclusion did not outweigh the
costs of extending it to collateral review.183 Thus, doctrines carving out exceptions to
the exclusionary rule also involve the withholding of substitutionary constitutional
remedies under public interest balancing.
3. Harmless Error Doctrines
The Supreme Court has developed two harmless error rules that regulate the avail-
ability of relief to those who seek reversal of a judgment affected by constitutional
trial error on direct or collateral review.184 On direct review, under the rule adopted
in Chapman v. California, a constitutional trial error requires reversal unless “the
175 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
176 Id.
177 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
178 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987).
179 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995).
180 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699–701 (2009).
181 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–94 (2006).
182 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2319, 2426–27 (2011).
183 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–95 (1976).
184 In this context, constitutional trial error must be differentiated from structural consti-
tutional error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–10 (1991) (dividing consti-
tutional errors into these two classes); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.
140, 149 (2006) (listing as recognized structural errors the denial of counsel (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)), the denial of the right of self-representation (citing McKaskle
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)), the denial of the right to public trial (citing
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n.9 (1984)), and the denial of the right to trial by jury by
the giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275 (1993))); id. at 150 (adding denial of the right of counsel of choice to the list of recognized
structural errors). A judgment infected by such structural error is not subject to harmless error
review. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10.
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beneficiary of [the] error [proves] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”185 On collateral review, under the rule
adopted in Brecht v. Abrahamson,186 such an error requires reversal only if the peti-
tioner establishes that it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury’s verdict.”187
The Court developed both rules as limits on the availability of the substitutionary
constitutional remedy of reversal of a conviction tainted by constitutional error. Prior
to the time the Court handed down Chapman, it was generally understood that consti-
tutional trial errors required automatic reversal.188 Prior to Brecht, it was understood
that the Chapman rule should govern the availability of collateral relief for constitu-
tional trial errors.189
Chapman and Brecht both used cost-benefit policy analysis to explain the limi-
tations on the availability of substitutionary relief that they imposed. In Chapman, the
Court quite briefly justified its adoption of a harmless error rule for constitutional errors
by stating that harmless error rules “serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block
setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of
having changed the result of the trial.”190 In Brecht, the Court candidly acknowledged
that its choice of the more forgiving Kotteakos harmless error standard191 was a conse-
quence of its having concluded that there was an “imbalance of . . . costs and benefits”
in applying the Chapman rule on collateral review.192 Accordingly, both rules stand
185 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Chapman rule only applies to those who have preserved their
appellate rights. Otherwise, an unforgiving “plain error” standard applies. See supra note 94.
186 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
187 Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Brecht adopted
the harmless error standard prescribed in Kotteakos for review of constitutional trial errors on
collateral review which elaborated on the meaning of a federal harmless error statute applicable
to non-constitutional trial errors. Id. That statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006),
directs courts to disregard errors or defects “which do not affect the substantial right of the
parties.” See Goldblatt, supra note 26, at 998–99 (explaining why Section 2111 does not apply
to constitutional trial errors).
188 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 157 & n.43 (1991) (collect-
ing cases); see also Goldblatt, supra note 26, at 995; John M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of
a Record? Harmless-Error Review of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental
Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 819, 825 (1994); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2002).
189 See Greabe, supra note 188, at 829 & n.69 (collecting cases).
190 386 U.S. at 22; see also id. at 22–24 (explaining the adoption of the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard in policy terms).
191 See supra note 186.
192 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; see also id. at 635–36 (emphasizing that “the State’s interest in
the finality of convictions that have survived direct review,” comity, federalism, and the interest
in maintaining the prominence of the trial itself all militate in favor of a more lenient harmless
error rule on collateral review than the rule that applies on direct review).
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as additional examples of the Court fashioning doctrines that withhold substitutionary
constitutional remedies under reasoning rooted in public interest balancing.
4. The Non-Retroactivity Principle of Teague v. Lane
The non-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane193 is much the same. The Teague
principle is best understood in the context of the development of the law of retroac-
tivity in criminal procedure. Traditionally, judicial decisions creating new law were
applied retroactively to the parties and to other litigants in pending cases that had
not yet become “final.”194 The Warren Court, however, developed criminal procedure
doctrines that permitted it to render constitutional decisions that would not apply retro-
actively in certain circumstances.195 Justice Harlan strongly criticized these doctrines196
and argued that courts should apply all decisions retroactively on direct review.197 He
conceded, however, that a state’s policy interest in finality almost always trumps this
imperative on collateral review.198 He thus engaged in a form of cost-benefit analysis
to suggest that new decisions should apply retroactively on collateral review only where
the decision (1) holds “previously punishable conduct to be constitutionally protected,”
or (2) recognizes a right of procedure that is “so fundamental as to be ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’”199
Justice Harlan’s position ultimately prevailed. In Griffith v. Kentucky,200 the
Court held that all new rules of criminal procedure should be fully retroactive on
direct review.201 And in Teague, the Court effectively accepted the Justice’s policy
193 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
194 FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1241 (explaining that “‘final’
means that certiorari has been denied or that the time for seeking [additional direct] appellate
review has expired”).
195 See id. (discussing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which declined to apply
the Mapp rule to convictions that became final before Mapp was decided; Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), which declined to apply the Miranda rules to trials that com-
menced before Miranda was decided; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), overruled
on other grounds, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), which developed a retroactivity test that looked to “the
purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the adminis-
tration of justice of retroactive application of the new rule”).
196 See id. at 1241–42 (discussing Justice Harlan’s separate opinions in Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 256–69 (1969), and Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675–702 (1971)).
197 See id. at 1242.
198 See id.
199 See id. Note that the first of these exceptions preserves the right to seek the one form
of specific relief available on collateral review. See supra note 113 and accompanying text;
see also infra Part IV (hypothesizing that specific constitutional relief is at least presump-
tively mandatory).
200 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
201 See id. at 320–28; see also FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at
1242. A retroactivity principle analogous to that announced in Griffith has been recognized
888 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:857
judgment with respect to collateral review.202 Teague thus stands as yet another ex-
ample of judicial lawmaking rooted in public interest balancing that limits the avail-
ability of substitutionary constitutional remedies.203
5. Constraints on Provisions of Structural Reform Injunctions That Are
Unnecessary to Prevent or Undo a Constitutional Violation
As discussed above, it is at best debatable under recent doctrine whether courts
ever may issue structural reform injunctions that contain provisions that do more than
just prevent or undo the constitutional violation that justified judicial intervention.204
Thus, we may safely generalize that courts never should approve of such provisions
in circumstances where their benefits are outweighed by their likely adverse impact on
the public interest. In other words, such provisions are plainly subject to being withheld
from remedial decrees under public interest balancing.
B. Doctrines Limiting the Availability of Specific Constitutional Remedies
In contrast to the limits on the availability of substitutionary constitutional remedies
discussed above, the Supreme Court has not authorized the withholding of specific con-
stitutional remedies on grounds of public interest balancing.205 In fact, the Court has
recognized only a few legitimate limits on the availability of specific constitutional rem-
edies for invasions of rights. And in each case, the recognized limits are rooted in struc-
tural federalism and separation of powers concerns that compete with, and sometimes
in the context of tax remedies as well. See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 89–90 (1993) (announcing that the constitutional ruling in Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), must apply retroactively). Moreover, in Reynoldsville Casket
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995), the Court cast doubt on the permissibility of invoking reme-
dial discretion to deny relief for the violation of a new constitutional rule in any context other
than one in which there is some other policy reason for doing so. For a summary of Harper and
Reynoldsville Casket, and for a suggestion that the principle articulated in the latter case is
ultimately incoherent, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 721–23.
202 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–14 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality). Justice
O’Connor accepted Justice Harlan’s position but reformulated his second exception into one
that holds that “a habeas court may apply a new rule that implicates the fundamental fairness
of the trial” and is necessary to prevent a serious diminishment of the likelihood of an accu-
rate conviction); FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1242. The Court has
endorsed and followed this opinion in numerous subsequent decisions. Id. For a comprehensive
overview of Teague and the questions it raises, see id. at 1242–48.
203 In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
imposed a relitigation bar that resembles but is distinct from the Teague rule. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2006) (codifying the relitigation bar); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per
curiam) (clarifying that the statutory and Teague inquiries are distinct).
204 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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trump, the powerful norm that courts should freely grant specific remedies to ameliorate
ongoing or imminent violations of constitutional rights.
1. Judicial Federalism Doctrines
The Supreme Court has identified a number of circumstances in which lower fed-
eral courts should not provide litigants with a remedy—specific or otherwise—even if
a claimant can establish an ongoing or imminent violation of her constitutional rights.
Sometimes, lower federal courts must decline to proceed because Congress has imposed
limitations on federal court intrusion into pending state court proceedings. Examples
of such statutory limitations include the federal Anti-Injunction Act,206 the Johnson
Act of 1934,207 and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937.208
Moreover, the Court has itself developed a number of federalism doctrines that
work to limit lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that fall within the literal
terms of congressional grants of jurisdiction.209 Some but not all of these doctrines can
operate to deflect from federal court jurisdiction justiciable claims for specific relief
for ongoing or imminent constitutional infringements that, absent federalism concerns,
would be entirely appropriate for federal adjudication.210 Examples of doctrines that 
206 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006), provides: “A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.” For a comprehensive discussion of the Act, its history, and its recognized excep-
tions, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1019–41.
207 The Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006), provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation
of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public
utility and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body
of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or
repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and,
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hear-
ing; and,
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.
For a discussion of the Johnson Act of 1934, including an extension of its proscriptions to de-
claratory judgment and damages actions, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note
10, at 1042–43.
208 The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), provides: “The district courts
shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” See also
supra note 134. For a discussion of the scope and breadth of the Tax Injunction Act, including
how its proscriptions have been extended to declaratory judgment and damages actions in both
federal and state court, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1043–49.
209 See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1049–151, 1311–53.
210 For example, there is a recognized doctrine that requires exhaustion of state nonjudicial
remedies. See id. at 1050–57. But this doctrine generally does not apply to actions under 42 
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can so operate include: Pullman abstention,211 Younger abstention,212 and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.213
It bears emphasis that each of these doctrines, whether statutory or judicially
created, is rooted in a constitutional imperative—federalism—that competes with the
ubi jus, ibi remedium principle.214 In other words, these doctrines are not grounded in
concerns about any adverse effects that the specific constitutional remedy requested
might have on the public interest. Moreover, and importantly, these doctrines do not
authorize the withholding of relief altogether, as do the doctrines discussed above in
connection with substitutionary constitutional remedies.215 At most, they sometimes
require that claimants forgo immediate specific remedies from a federal court and
U.S.C. § 1983, see id. at 1052–53 (discussing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)),
although there are a few recognized exceptions to the Patsy rule. See id. at 1054–56.
211 See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts should
abstain from adjudicating the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation
until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass on them). For a com-
prehensive discussion of Pullman abstention and related doctrines, including a note explaining
that Pullman abstention applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a note on abstention
under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (authorizing abstention where a federal
action challenges certain state administrative action subject to timely and adequate state court
review) and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (authorizing
abstention where a federal action implicates difficult questions of state law bearing on impor-
tant state policy problems whose import transcends the underlying case), see FALLON ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1057–83.
212 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts should abstain
from hearing constitutional challenges that can be raised in a pending state court criminal
prosecution). For a comprehensive discussion of Younger and related doctrines, including the
restriction of Younger to pending cases under the rule recognized in Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974), the limitation on Steffel recognized in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)
(holding that the federal court should abstain if the state initiates criminal proceedings after the
initiation of the federal action but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken
place in federal court), and the extension of Younger to the civil context, see FALLON ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1083–128.
213 The so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), prohibits parties subject to adverse state-court judgments rendered before federal pro-
ceedings were commenced from receiving relief from those judgments in federal court other
than by means of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(2006). See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). For a discus-
sion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note
10, at 1346–53.
214 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
215 See also id. at 1937 (observing that a reading of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006), that would preclude a remedy for unconstitutional prison over-
crowding “would raise serious constitutional concerns” (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986))); cf. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011)
(observing that the ongoing constitutional violation of prison overcrowding “requires a remedy”).
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instead seek relief from a state court—substitutionary or specific—that cannot be with-
held as a matter of due process.216
2. Statutory Preclusion
The Supreme Court also has recognized that Congress has the authority to enact
statutes that preclude otherwise justiciable and proper claims seeking specific consti-
tutional relief and divert such claims into alternative and exclusive statutory or admin-
istrative enforcement regimes. One example, already mentioned, requires claimants
seeking a refund for an unconstitutional federal tax to forgo a claim for specific relief
and to seek an administrative refund remedy before suing the United States.217 Another
was validated in Yakus v. United States,218 where the Court upheld legislation pro-
hibiting a criminal defendant from seeking nullification of the law authorizing the
prosecution where the defendant had already had an opportunity to challenge it in
a prior administrative proceeding.219 More recently, in Elgin v. Department of the
Treasury,220 the Court held that the federal Civil Service Reform Act221 provides the
exclusive avenue to judicial review when a qualifying federal employee challenges an
adverse employment action by arguing that the federal statute requiring the action is
unconstitutional on its face.222 And in Smith v. Robinson,223 the Court held that the fed-
eral Education of the Handicapped Act224 provided the exclusive avenue for specific
216 See supra Part II.B.2.e and especially note 134 (explaining that specific remedies to
enjoin the collection of an unconstitutional tax are frequently unavailable but that due process
requires the provision of post-deprivation relief for unconstitutionally exacted taxes). Due
process protects those seeking specific constitutional relief in a federal court from the double
whammy of being told to seek a remedy elsewhere and then subsequently being told that a
sovereign immunity doctrine makes the relief unavailable in the alternative forum. Cf. Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366–70 (1953) (discussing this theoretical dilemma
and opining that it would be unconstitutional to provide fewer than one bite at the constitu-
tional apple).
217 See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006) (precluding, with limited exceptions, any suit for the
purpose of restraining the collection of any tax); United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining
Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511 (2008) (detailing how a taxpayer forced to pay an unlawful federal tax
must seek a refund administratively before suing the government for a refund under the Tucker
Act); see also supra notes 134 & 137 and accompanying text.
218 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
219 See id. at 443–48. For a discussion of Yakus and related cases and developments, in-
cluding a note questioning whether the scheme upheld in Yakus would be constitutional absent
the exigency of potential wartime inflation that was present in that case, see FALLON ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 322–24.
220 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).
221 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2006).
222 See 132 S. Ct. at 2132–40.
223 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
224 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006). The statute is now known as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. Id. § 1400(a).
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relief from state and local officials under an equal protection claim that was virtually
identical to an authorized statutory discrimination claim.225
But again, in each instance, the refusal to provide relief was rooted in an impera-
tive of constitutional structure—i.e., the obligation under separation of powers concerns
to honor congressional authority over remedies—and not in any expressed judicial con-
cern about the effect that the relief sought might have on the public interest. Moreover,
as with the judicial federalism doctrines, the Court has emphasized that an entirely
different question would be presented if the preclusive and diversionary statute would
have the effect of extinguishing the claim for a constitutional remedy altogether.226
IV. A LINK TO CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY REMEDIES?
Parts II and III have shown that the modern Supreme Court frequently exercises
its normative and allocative discretion with respect to public interest balancing227 to
formulate doctrines that require lower courts to withhold substitutionary constitutional
relief and to leave wholly realized constitutional harms entirely without a remedy. They
also have shown that, in contrast, the modern Court has treated the provision of specific
constitutional remedies as routine, at least in cases where neither a judicial federalism
nor a statutory preclusion doctrine applies. And even in these rather exceptional cases,
the Court has expressed an unwillingness to countenance the withholding of reme-
dies altogether; instead, it has emphasized that “serious constitutional concerns” would
ensue if effective constitutional relief were unavailable in the alternative forums to
which it has redirected some claimants pressing claims for specific relief.228
This final Part considers whether it is appropriate to draw from the described
judicial behavior and statements any conclusions with respect to constitutionally nec-
essary remedies.229 The topic is vast, and it will require another paper to fully explore
whether the Court’s willingness to engage in public interest balancing to withhold sub-
stitutionary, but not specific, constitutional remedies tracks a firm constitutional limit
on judicial and congressional remedial prerogative.230 But with that caveat, I believe
that the differential treatment the Court accords such remedies with respect to public
225 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009–13. For an analysis of “proxy” enforcement of the
Constitution in and through sub-constitutional regimes such as the examples just discussed,
see John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009).
226 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012 n.15 (emphasizing that the statutory remedy simply re-
placed the constitutional one and that “[t]here is no issue here of Congress’ ability to preclude
the federal courts from granting a remedy for a constitutional deprivation”).
227 See supra note 9.
228 See supra notes 215–16 & 226 and accompanying text.
229 For a summary of views on constitutionally necessary remedies, see supra notes 13–19
and accompanying text.
230 See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1104–05 (opining that a comprehen-
sive theory of constitutionally necessary remedies would likely require book-length treatment).
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interest balancing supports a two-part hypothesis. First, substitutionary constitutional
remedies, while integral as a class to the proper functioning of our constitutional order,
are properly regarded as individually contingent; such remedies are susceptible to leg-
islative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as the perceived public in-
terest dictates. Second, specific constitutional remedies should be freely available for
most justiciable and meritorious claims of constitutional right. Moreover, an effective
constitutional remedy should be available from the alternative forum in those excep-
tional cases where claimants seeking specific relief are legitimately subject to diver-
sion from federal court by a judicial federalism or statutory preclusion doctrine. And
public interest balancing should not be employed in connection with claims for specific
constitutional relief.
Obviously, the fact that the Supreme Court has engaged in public interest bal-
ancing to fashion doctrines requiring lower courts to withhold each type of substitu-
tionary constitutional remedy goes a very long way towards refuting any descriptive
claim that such remedies are constitutionally mandatory. Indeed, if one eschews purely
normative or historical argument and seeks to develop a theory of constitutionally nec-
essary remedies that rationalizes what the modern Court actually has done, one simply
cannot maintain that a wholly realized violation of an individual constitutional right re-
quires, ipso facto, a damages award, the subsequent exclusion of evidence, the reversal
of a tainted conviction, or (most obviously) a structural reform injunction containing
constitutionally extraneous provisions. The now well-established doctrines limiting
the availability of these substitutionary constitutional remedies, discussed above,231
render such an argument difficult to sustain.
The argument that substitutionary constitutional remedies are constitutionally
contingent also survives a shift in perspective from the descriptive to the normative.
Certainly, the elimination without replacement of any one class of substitutionary
constitutional remedy—let alone the wholesale elimination of all classes of such
remedies—would raise a very serious constitutional issue. And just as certainly, the
curtailment or elimination of certain substitutionary constitutional remedies would
raise graver concerns than the curtailment or elimination of other substitutionary con-
stitutional remedies; the necessity of any one type of substitutionary constitutional
remedy surely should vary depending on the nature of the underlying violation that is
alleged.232 Even so, there are several reasons for treating substitutionary constitutional
remedies—as a class—as inherently contingent and subject to legitimate alteration by
Congress or the Supreme Court.
Substitutionary constitutional remedies are often and accurately described as spe-
cies of sub-constitutional common law because they lack the textual and historical
231 See supra Part III.A.
232 See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J.
259 (2000) (arguing persuasively that the granting and withholding of constitutional remedies
ought to vary depending on the underlying claim and the underlying constitutional right asserted
in support of the claim).
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pedigrees of their specific remedial counterparts.233 By their very nature, they fail to
prevent or undo the constitutional harm to which they are responsive.234 They most fre-
quently apply only to the wholly concluded discretionary actions of the many individ-
uals who necessarily exercise government power in modern society; they typically are
not available to ameliorate the unconstitutional legislative or executive policies or
customs that are more readily attributed to a coordinated branch of the government
than the unlawful act of a single government agent.235 And finally, they can visit very
significant costs on members of the polity who employ or contract with the targeted
defendant, including of course the symbolically potent release of the dangerous crim-
inal by operation of the exclusionary rule “because the constable has blundered.”236 In
view of all these things, it is an uphill battle to argue that courts always must issue
a substitutionary constitutional remedy upon finding a wholly concluded invasion of
an individual constitutional right, irrespective of the perceived effect such a remedy
might have on the public interest.
Specific constitutional remedies, in contrast, present quite a different set of consid-
erations. Specific constitutional remedies are far more closely tied to constitutional text
and structure. Two such remedies—habeas corpus and just compensation for takings
claims—are explicitly contemplated,237 and the rest are strongly implied, at least once
one accepts the legitimacy of the anticipatory action for specific relief by a party with
Article III standing.238 Moreover, and just as importantly, the enforcement of individual
233 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 26, at 29–34 (comparing Chapman with Bivens and
arguing that both rules are at least partially sub-constitutional); Monaghan, supra note 24,
at 200 n.30 (describing the Chapman harmless error rule as constitutional common law);
Monaghan, supra note 23, at 3–10 (describing the exclusionary rule as example of constitu-
tional common law); id. at 23–24 (describing the implied Bivens damages remedy as constitu-
tional common law). Of all the recognized substitutionary constitutional remedies, it is perhaps
hardest to envision the permissible elimination of a right to secure reversal of a criminal con-
viction tainted by constitutional error. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there
is no constitutional right to an appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987)
(quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974)); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Moreover, no general right to appeal
existed in colonial or English practice, in the states at the time of the Founding, or in the fed-
eral courts until 1891. See Meltzer, supra note 26, at 6 (collecting authority). In view of all
this, it is difficult to claim that there is a constitutional right to secure post hoc reversal of a
conviction infected by constitutional error.
234 Paul Gewirtz has argued that the law of remedies is by its nature “a jurisprudence of
deficiency, of what is lost between declaring a right and implementing a remedy.” Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983). Gerwitz’s statements describe reality
with respect to all remedies but apply with special force to substitutionary remedies.
235 See supra Part II.C.
236 See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
237 See supra Parts II.B.2.c–d.
238 There is broad agreement that nullification of unconstitutional laws by the subject of gov-
ernment enforcement actions is the quintessentially necessary constitutional remedy from an
Article III court with the power of judicial review. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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rights through specific relief protects constitutional structure in much the same way
that the enforcement of structure through the power of judicial review can protect
individual rights.239 As already discussed, specific remedies tend to be available only
in situations where the government action being challenged is undertaken pursuant
to some “law”—i.e., some policy or custom directly attributable to one of the politi-
cal branches of the federal and state governments.240 Thus, specific remedies reason-
ably may be seen as more essential than their substitutionary counterparts for keeping
the coordinate federal branches and the states within constitutional boundaries at the
lawmaking level.
One final point is also worth noting. The most comprehensive descriptive account
of constitutionally necessary remedies to be found in the academic literature—an
analysis provided by Professor Fallon in a recent Virginia Law Review article241—is
entirely consistent with the hypothesis that this Part advances. Fallon begins by noting
the primacy of Professor Henry Hart’s observation that complaints about the preclu-
sion of a particular remedy “can rarely be of constitutional dimension.”242 But Fallon
then observes that Hart, who wrote in 1953 before the explosion of substitutionary
constitutional remedies and related doctrines that occurred during and after the Warren
Court years, was troubled by the notion that constitutional remedies could be with-
held altogether.243 Fallon draws on this background to describe the theory of consti-
tutionally necessary remedies that he and Professor Meltzer proposed in 1991—that
there be a rebuttable presumption in favor of effective relief in all cases, and a suf-
ficient scheme of remedies to keep government officials answerable to the demands
of the Constitution244—as being designed to harmonize modern doctrinal reality (in
which constitutional remedies are often withheld) with Hart’s claims about constitu-
tional remedies.245
239 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (citing New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (describing how our federalist structure pre-
serves individual liberties); see also id. (“By denying any one government complete juris-
diction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from
arbitrary power.” (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011))).
240 See supra Part II.C.
241 See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1104–15. Fallon’s account elaborates
on the general theory of constitutionally necessary remedies he and Professor Meltzer initially
proposed in 1991. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1787–91.
242 Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1105 (quoting Hart, supra note 216,
at 1366) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 Id. at 1106 (observing that the question of whether constitutional remedies may be entirely
withheld has never really been squarely presented because of “[t]he multiplicity of remedies,
and the fact that Congress has seldom if ever tried to take them all away” (quoting Hart, supra
note 216, at 1369)).
244 See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (summarizing Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 16, at 1787–91).
245 See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1107–08.
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Turning to what the modern Court has said and done, Professor Fallon identifies
five classes of constitutional remedies that should be regarded as constitutionally
necessary.246 Interestingly, not one of these five classes contains any substitutionary
constitutional remedy. Instead, the five classes largely describe the field of specific
constitutional remedies discussed in Part II.B of this paper: (1) nullification of consti-
tutionally invalid laws,247 (2) habeas corpus,248 (3) post-deprivation monetary remedies
for coercive deprivations of property and liberty,249 (4) injunctive or similarly effective
relief against ongoing deprivations of constitutional rights that would not be adequately
compensable by damages,250 and (5) remedies for deprivations of “new property.”251
Thus, although he travels a different road, Fallon arrives at the same destination to
which we are led by an examination of the Court’s use of public interest balancing
to withhold constitutional remedies.
CONCLUSION
The use of traditional law/equity terms to classify constitutional remedies can
operate to obscure important truths about how modern courts behave in issuing and
administering such remedies. It is far more useful to reclassify constitutional remedies
in terms of how they function. Do they provide the original thing or condition to which
the claimant was entitled? Or do they provide something else? If the former, they are
specific; if the latter, they are substitutionary.
The adoption of a functional classification of constitutional remedies is clarifying.
It reveals that the conventional account of our remedial tradition, which associates the
discretionary withholding of remedies under public interest balancing only with the
specific remedies typically issued in equity, has things entirely wrong with respect to
constitutional remedies. In the context of constitutional remedies, the modern Supreme
Court uses public interest balancing only to withhold the substitutionary remedies
246 See id. at 1108–15.
247 See id. at 1108.
248 See id. at 1109.
249 See id. at 1109–11. Professor Fallon discusses the tax refund and takings cases under
this heading. See id.
250 See id. at 1111–13. In describing this class of remedies as encompassing only those
claims for injunctive relief that would not be adequately compensated by damages, Professor
Fallon nods to the traditional idea that injunctive relief will not lie where there is an adequate
remedy at law. But in his discussion of the class, Fallon acknowledges that the modern Supreme
Court has treated injunctive relief as routine since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1112–13.
251 See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 10, at 1114–15. This class includes claims
based on individual constitutional rights, such as equal protection or due process, arising from
the government’s distribution of statutorily created entitlements. See id. at 1114. Such claims are
a subset of the claims seeking specific relief for ongoing or imminent constitutional violations
discussed in Part II.B.2.b.
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usually provided at law.252 It does not use public interest balancing to withhold the
specific relief typically administered in equity.253
Appreciation of this fact is highly useful in and of itself, but it also illuminates
the complex topic of constitutionally necessary remedies. Any theory of constitution-
ally necessary remedies that seeks to rationalize what modern courts actually do must
respond to this reality and consider whether the Supreme Court’s behavior tracks a
constitutional boundary. For the reasons stated above, I believe that it does.
252 See supra Part III.A.1.
253 See supra Part III.B.
